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In the Suprem.e Court of the
State of lJtah

LEAH C. JONES; MARTHA
C. WHITING and LEAH·, C.
BEETON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

CASE NO
7424

MARK B. COOK,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMEN~

OF FACTS

Appellants' "Statement of the Case" contains various
items of argument which \Ve shall not undertake to correct
until we come to the division devoted to argument in this
brief. Exception further must be taken because it does
not set out a number of the important facts which are established by the record, and to which we will call attention
in this statement. It also recites as "facts" testimony which,
although appearing in the record, is controverted by other
preponderating testimony. In other words, while there is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

some evidence to support much of the statement presented
by appellants, yet as to several of the facts claimed, other
evidence preponderates. The court found against appellants, afld in view 6f this, we aTe noting below facts con·trary to those cited by appellants or in explanation of them,
which we believe are supported by the preponderance of
the evidence and whiCh .ba¥e .been .,ccmfirmed by the findings of the court.
With respect to pleadings, in addition to the denial of
respondent's ownership of the .automobile and the .other
matters mentioned in appellants' statement, the answer Qf
defendant alleges fully the personal and other notices given
to the plaintiffs of the probate proceedings (JR 8-9) and
the personal knowledge of the plaintiffs concerning defendant's claims to, and possession of, the autotnobile (JR 10).
Appellants claim on page 4 of their brief that "they
(the plaintiffs) also admit that Mark B. Cook, the defendant, during the time he was acting as executor, had possession of the automobile as by. law permitted; that Irene B.
Cook held a life estat.e in said aut'Dmobile tmtil the date of
her death." By this, it seems to_ be inferred that the defendant alleged that during the time he was acting as executor he had possession of the automobile as by law permitted and alleged that Irene B. ,Cook held a life estate in
said automobile. This _is contrary to the facts, since Mark
B.. CookJ at all times, both in his pleadings, in his testimony
and by his conduct and otherwise, claimed and took the position that he had possession of the automobile under a
personal claim of right and that neither Irene B. Cook nor
the plaintiffs had any interest in the automobile (JR 10-11).
Leah C. Jones., one .of the plaintiffs, testified that she
was interested in keeping track of the car even before her
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father"s death (Tr 11) and she knew that the defendant
was using the car whenever he \Vanted to (Tr 13). The
plaintiffs first decided in February of 1945 that there was
a question in their minds as to whom the car belonged (Tr
13) and apparently had in mind making a claim as early as
February, 1945, but the date a claim for the car was com-·
municated by the plaintiffs was in May, 1948, when plaintiffs' attorney made a demand (Tr 14).
The defendant was the only one that had any possession of the car after the father's death as far as the plaintiff, Leah C. Jones, knew (Tr 14). The three plaintiffs and
Irene B. Cook were present in court when the estate of their
father \Vas ordered distributed and they made no objections
to the distribution (Tr 15). They knew that there was a
decree of distribution and that it was sent over to their
mother's place and the \vitness, Jones, saw it at least after_
her mother's death. The \vitness also knew Mark went on
using the car (Tr 15) ._
}

Although the plaintiff, Jones, had taken an interest in
the car before she \Vas appointed administratrix of her mother's estate, she at no time said anything to Mark. She knew
IY.Iark had gotten the license plates to the car in 1945 (Tr
16-17). She stated that the question of taxes didn't concern
her in 1945. Although it was uncontradicted that Mark
had paid all taxes, she stated that all that concerned her was
who owned the car (Tr 16). She knew that no one else
had the possession of -the car excepting the defendant and
perhaps his wife, sometimes (Tr 17) . She said she didn't
think that the hearing of the appraising of the estate was
the time to make any objections (Tr 17).
While there was a policy of insurance issued to Irene
B. Cook in June, 1944, this policy \vas issued in the absence
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of the defendant, the agent telling Mrs. Cook that there had
been a policy in May, 1943, which had lapsed and she was
asked to renew it (Tr 38). This was in June, 1944, before
Mark B. Cook was appointed executor. The insurance was
not for damage to the car itself but was ·for public liability
and property damage to others (Tr 39).
The plaintiff, Martha C. Whiting, was also called as a
witness, the third plaintiff not testifying. She admitted
that none of the sisters were known to use the car either
before or after her father's death; the mother, Irene B.
Cook, asked Mark to let the car go up to Logan on a trip
on which one of the plaintiffs' sons was to drive and Mark
refused (Tr 46). This was about the 24th of July, 1944.
The defendant at that time said he needed the car. While
the witness stated that Mark kept the car at times in the
garage of his mother's place, she admitted that he had other
things in the garage belonging to him, among which it
seemed to the witness, was a tractor (Tr 50).
Mark B. Cook testified that he received the certificate
of title to the car in question the first part of May, 1943 (Tr
55) and had it in his possession ever since them (Tr 78).
He denied that he later obtained the certificate from his
mother as claimed by the witness, Leah C. Jones (Tr 7980). It should. be observed that the claim of plaintiffs that
defendant actually received the certificate from pis mother
rather than from his father is based on hearsay (Tr 115).
After receiving the certificate, he had the car in his
possession and claimed it as his own, and the first time he
was ever notified that claim was made to the car, other
than by himself, was in 1948, when the received a letter
from plaintiffs' attorney (Tr 60).
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It is apparent that the court, in view of his findings,
believed Mark Cook.
He also testified that his name was Mark B. Cbok and
that he was also known as Mark Cook and Mark Cook, Jr.,
he further testified that his name was in the phone book
as Mark Cook, Jr. (Tr 80). It thus was readily apparent
why he did not consider it necessary to change the name on
the certificate of title from Mark Cook.
He further testified that the automobile was kept in
his father's garage up to the winter of 1943-44, after which
he kept it at his place and has never kept it at his mother's
place since. He further testified that -he had had the car
exclusively in his possession from 1943 (Tr 87).
He was appointed executor of his father's estate in
July, 1944. He first learned that his father had made a will
after his mother had returned from Arizona and his mother
returned in April, 1944 (Tr 88). It will thus be seen he had
possession of, and claiiped, title to the car at least a year before he knew that his father had made a will He further
testified that in the winter of 1943-44 the reason he kept
the automobile at his father's garage was because heavy
snow made it impractical to keep it at his home (Tr 89).
He did not then have a garage himself, but fixed up one at
the end of the winter and at all times after that, kept the
car in his own garage (Tr 89) .
,
The defendant did not know about insurance when his
mother took it out. When the policy was delivered to her,
she told Mark she wanted to keep the insurance up so he
wouldn't get into trouble. The defendant told her he would
have to pay for it, but that he didn't want that kind of in-·
surance as it was only liability insurance and wouldn't in-.
elude collision insurance on the car; the defendant himself,
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in June, 1945, took out full coverage (Tr 106). He paid his

mother for the liability policy and took it home (Tr 104) a
few days after it was delivered to her.
Mrs. Mark B. Cook testified that she first saw the certificate to the car the day Mr. Cook gave it to the defendant. His father had asked the son to take him for a ride,
and on this ride, in the presence of Mrs. Cook, Mark and the
witness, at a time when they were stopped at Deer Creek
Dam, the father handed Mark the certificate of ownership
and the extra set of keys to the car and stated, "I am giving
it to you with the understanding that you take mother and
I at any time when w~ want to go." (Tr 94). There was
a set of keys in the car and he also gave Mark the extra set
of keys (Tr 95) . The witness further testified that Mr.
Cook said, '·'I am giving you the car. I am giving you the
car with the _understanding you take mother and I when
we want to go." (Tr 100).
Mark used the car almost every ~ay (Tr 103).
Leah C. ·Jones on rebuttal admitted that in February,
1945,·· before she had contacted her attorneys, she was
watching the car and that the plaintiffs discussed the car
between themselves and that her sisters and she discussed
it and that her mother discussed the way things were going (Tr 117). She kne\V about these discussions when the
final account and petition for distribution were heard (Tr
117).

She further testified that she k.new the car \Vas not in
the inventory (Tr 126) and thereafter, she said she couldn't
answer the question as to whether she knew it was not in
the inventory; she said that they thought about the car but
they didn't want to bring it up because their mother had
ill health (Tr 127). She further testified, "We didn't want
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trouble with ·Mark", and fw~ther said she thought the car
belonged to them. She further testified that she didn't recall saying anything about the car to Mark (Tr 182); that
they didn't say anything about it to Mark's attorney (Tr
127) and that they didn't care to fuss about the car while
their mother was alive (Tr 128). She further testified that
while they wrote to the State Tax Commission in February,
1945, they didn't say anything to Mark about the car "because it \Vouldn't have done any good. We knew from experience." (Tr 192). She further testified that she knew
her mother went over and asked for the car so that the son
of the witness could drive it to Logan and that Mark refsed her (Tr 131).
'
There was received in evidence as defendant's Exhibit
5 the inventory and appraisement in the estate of Mark
Cook, deceased, and the certificate that the same contained
a true statement of all of the es\ate of the said deceased
which had come to the kno\vledge and possession of the
executor (Tr 62). The inheritance tax report and appraisement filed in the estate of Mark Cook, deceased, was also
received; this report and appraisement contained no reference to the automobile in question; also, the order prescribing notices of inheritance tax appraisement (Defendant's
Exhibit 7) (Tr 63) and the notice of the hearing given by
the tax appraisers (Defendant's Exhibit 8) and the proof
of the service of notice upon each of the plaintiffs (Defendant's Exhibit 9) (Tr 64, 72).
Defendant's Exhibit 10, being proof of postin~ and mailing notices of the hearing of the petition· of final distribution, was received in evidence, showing both posting as required by law and also service by mailing upon all of the
plaintiffs, together with others (74-75).
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The decree allowing and approving the final account
in the matter of the estate of Mark Cook, deceased, was received in evidence. Since, in appellants' "Statement of the
Case", they assume to interpret this decree by a fragmentary reference to a recital concerning· ''unknown or undiscovered property"', we are quoting in full the pertinent provisions and stipulations made at the trial with respect thereto:
''Mark B. Cook, executor of the last will and testament
of Mark Cook, deceased, having on the 6th day of AUgust, 1945, filed in this court the final account of said
executor together with a petition for final distribution
of the residue of the estate of said deceased, and said
account and petition coming on regularly to be heard
before the court the 18th day of August, A. D. 1945,
and it having been made to appear to the court at said
hearing that notice ther~f had been given for the time
and in the manner ordered by the court and as pro.- vided by law, and the court having heard sworn evidence on_ behalf of the petitioner in support of said petition, and it appearing therefrom to the satisfaction
of the court that .due· and legal notice to the ereditors
· of said decedent has been given for the time and in the
manner required by law, and further, that a decree
showing that such due and legal notice has been given,
has heretofore been made· and filed herein as provided
by law; and it further appearing from the evfdence that
· all of the claims and .debts against the decedent and
·against· his estate and all inheritance taxes due and
payable and all property taxes payable by and or on
·aceount of. said estate and· all debts, charges and expenses of administrat~on have· been duly and fully paid
and discharged, and that said estate is now in a condition to be cloSed.
"IT IS, TI-IEREF10RE, HEREBY ORDiERED, AD-
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that the final account of
said executor, Mark B. Cook, be and the same is hereby
approved, allowed and settled, and that the residue of
said estate of Mark Cook, deceased, as hereinafter particularly described, and any and all other property not
· now known or discovered which may belong to said
estate or in which said estate may have any interest
be, and the same is hereby distributed in accordance
with said last will and testament of said decedent and
as hereinafter set out, to-wit:
JUDGED AND DECREED:

"To Irene B. Cook, surviving widow of said deceased,
all of the estate and property of said deceased for her
use and benefit during her natural life, with the remainder or reversionary interest therein to be distributed as hereinafter specifically provided; said property
above referred to and hereby· distributed is described
as follows, to-wit:
"And Judge, you want me to read all of the descriptions
of the real estate?
MR. CBRISTENSON:
THE _COURT:
the automobile?

I don't think so.

It describes the property without

MR. HANSEN: I don't know about all of the
property, probably not. We might read on this. There
are one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, ninethere are nine tracts of land.
MR. CHRISTENSON: There is no question about
him having received the real estate, I take it, and it's
been distributed?
MR. HANSEN: The nine tracts of land described
and then follows this:
(Reading)
"Water stocks. 1 share Mapleton Irrigation Co., cert.
No. 506. 5lj2 shares Springville Irrigation Co., cert.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
No. 171. 96 shares Big Hbllow Irrigation Co., cert. No.
1 for 72 shares, cert~ No. 12 for 24 shares.
''Farm machinery and equipment. Combine harvester,
scraper, double disk, cultivator, horse, cow, calf. Together with any and all other farm equipment and other property now upon or used in connection with said
real property and belonging to said estate.
"Househeld furniture belonging to said deceased.
''To Mark B. Cook, son of said deceased, the reversionary ~nterest in all of the above described real estate,
· water stock and all farm machinery and equipment and
livestock belonging to the estate or used in connection
with said real estate, subject only to the life estate in
Irene B. Cook, ·widow of said deceased;
''To Leah C. Jones, Martha C. Whiting and Louise C.
Beeton, daughters of said deceased, the -reversionary.
interest in and to all of the rest, residue and remainder
of the estate of said deceased, in equal undivided shares,
subject however, to be _held by said Irene B. Cook, surviving widow of said deceased, during her natural life,
who is entitled to the use and enjoyment of all of the
income therefrom- as long as she may live.
"The following described· property included in the inventory and appraisement herein for inheritance tax
and other purposes was held in joint tenancy by said
deceased, and is now the individual property of said
Irene B. Cook, to-wit: 213-American Wholesale Grocery Co.; stock cert. No. 8 for 18 shares, cert. No. 175
for 40 shares, total .58 shares. Utah Wholesale Grocery Co. stock, cert. No. 860 for 111 shares. Springville Banking Co. stock, cert. No. 266 for 10 shares.
U. S. War Savings Bonds, C33216793E-$100; C3321-6794E - $100; C16000163E - $100; C16988096E - $100;
L6125490E-$50; Q21659673E-$25.
-"Done in open court this 18th day of August, 1945.
Joseph E. Nelson, Judge."
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It will thus be noted that the decree specifically defines
the property included in the estate and as referred to in
the recitals to which appellants called attention, and in detail sets out the items without any reference to the automobile.
Among other things, the court .determined in its findings of fact:
"1. That on May 24th, 1941, one Mark Cook, now deceased, became the O\vner of a certain Ford sedan automobile, motor No. E-441914, referred to in plaintiff's
complaint and defendant's answer, and that he continued the possession thereof until on or about the
first week in May, 1943, when the possession of said
automobile was delivered by said Mark Cook to the
defendant, his son, and that ever since said time, the
defendant has been in possession of said automobile
with the knowledge of the plaintiffs, under the claim
in good faith made by the defendant that said automobile had been given to the defendant by the said Mark
Cook as a gift, and that -defendant has since said time
paid all taxes on said automobile; both county and
state, out of his own funds. Whether there was in fact
a valid gift of said automobile the court makes no finding by reason of the other determinative findings which
follow. (JR 20-21)
"10. That during or before the month of February,
1945, and long prior to the date of said decree, the
plaintiffs had full knowledge of the individual claim
of the defendant to the ownership 'of said automobile,
and of the defendant's possession thereof pursuant to
said claim, and that when said decree was made and
entered, the said automobile and the facts with respect
to defendant's claim thereto were, and had been, known
and discovered." (JR 24-25)
Irene B. Cook acknowledged receipt of "all of the propSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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erty· distributed. to me under .the decree of distribution.''
(JR 25, finding No. 11).
The court further found:
"14. ··The court further finds that notwithstanding
their knowledge that the defendant claimed said automobile as his own personal property and possession of
the same by virtue of said claim, neither Irene B. Cook,
nor the plaintiffs herein, or either of them, have ever
1nade or filed any objections or protests on account of
the failure. ·of Mark .B. Cook as the executor aforesaid,
or otherWiSe, to list the said automobile .involved in this
action in the inventory and appraisement as a part of
the estate of said Mark Cook, deceased; nor have they,
or either of them, ·ever made or filed any objection or
.. protest on account of. tl).e ~ailure of said Mark B~ Cook
as the executor aforesaid, or otherwise, to list said
automobile in his report to the Inheritance Tax Appraisers or his failureto~have the same appraised therein; nor have the said plaintiff~ therein or said Irene B.
· .·cook, or either of them, ever made or filed any objection· or protest to the failure of said Mark B. Cook as
such executor or otherwise., to list said automobile in
his final account filed .in said estate or in the petition
for ~final distribution of the residue of the estate of said
deceased, nor of his fai~ure. to have. the same included
in the decree of final distribution, nor have the plaintiffs ever made or filed ·any claim whatsoever, or in
any \VJ.Y notified defendant that they claimed any interest in -said automobile· until long after the time for
appeal from the decree of final allowance of the said
final account and from the said Jinal decree of distri·bution had expired in the matter of the estate of lVIark
~Cook, deceased.
''15. That the decree allowing and approving the final
account of said Mark B. Cook, as the executor of the
will of said Mark Cook, deceased, and the decree there-
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in of final distribution dated September 5th, 1945, are
res judicata and that the plaintiffs herein are thereby
estopped to claim any right, title or interest in said
automobile involved in this action, to wit: that certain
Ford sedan automobile, Motor No. E-441914.
"16. The court further finds that for more than three
years immediately prior to the commencement of this
action, the defendant, Mark B. Cook, has had and held
in good faith the open, notorious and adverse possession of the said automobile hereinabove referred to,
and described and involved in this action, under a claim
of individual right and with the knowledge of the plaintiffs of said possession and claim, and that the said
cause of action of ·the plaintiffs herein is barred under
and by virtue of Title 104, Chapter 2, Subdivision 2 of
Section 24, Utah Code Annotated, 1943."
CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

We believe that the findings as made by the trial court
finally dispose of the case. We also believe, ho\vever, that .
the court, in addition, should have found on the issue raised
by the complaint alleging O\vnership in the plaintiffs and
the answer denying such ownership that the plaintiffs were
not the owners of said car, but that said car had been given
by Mark-' Cook, defendant's father, as a gift to the defendant during the fh~st week of. May, 1943,_ and that the d~
fendant was ever since said time, and no\V is, the owner of
said car.
We therefore submit in the event this court should determine that the defenses of res judicata and Statute of Limitations do not dispose of the case, the judgment in favor
of the defendant should nevertheless be sustained by this
court under the following cross-assignment:
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1. The court erred in failing to find that plaintiffs
were not, and never have been, the owners of the automobile in question, and in failing ·to find that the plaintiff became the owner of said automobile during the fi~st part of
_May, 1943, by gift from his father and that ever since said
time, he was, and now is, the owner of said automobile,
which finding is required by the undisputed evidence.

ARGUMENT
The plaintiffs state three main questions as being presented:
FIRST: Does the decree of distribution distribute the
a\ltomobile to the plaintiffs herein?
Our position on this proposition is that not only does
the decree of distribution fail to distribute the automobile
to the plaintiffs, but that irrespective of the decree of distribution, the automobile was not a part of the estate of the
deceased· and could not have been included in the decree as
it was the property of the defendant by gift from his father.
Under this heading, therefore, we shall answer the corresponding arguments of appellants and also defendant's crossassignment.
SECOND: May an executor of an estate acquire title
to· either real or personal property of an estate or deprive
the persons entitled to· such property of all- rights therein
by neglecting to place the same in an inventory and appraisement and otherwise failing to account therefor?
This question as stated by appellants is in the nature
of a straw man because it assumes that the plaintiffs are
entitle<l. to the property, and that the property was part of
th~. estate. We will discuss this question in relation to the
decisions of the court which indicate that the decree of
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distribution in this case could be attacked only for extrinsic
fraud. We will show that the record fails to indicate extrinsic fraud, that there are no pleadings raising such issue
and that the case was not tried on any such theory. We
will also show that the plaintiffs knew about the claims of
defendant throughout the course of the probate proceedings and intentionally chose not to contest them. Rather
than use the phraseology of plaintiffs in discussing these
questions, we shall discuss them under the heading, "Are
the claims of the plaintiffs res judicata by virtue of the decree and other proceedings of the probate court?"
THIRD: May an executor by paying. taxes on the
property of an estate which he is administering acquire title
to such proerty by adverse possession?
This proposition is, in a sense, another false issue,_ as it
assumes that the automobile was property of the estate
which he was administering, and ignores the proof not only
that the automobile had been given to the defendant prior
to the death of Mark Cook, but that the defendant came
into the possession of the automobile before the death of
the donor, before he had made any will, before the defendant knew of the existence of any will and long before he was
appointed executor; and that defendant had claimed the
automobile as his own, with the knowledge of the plaintiffs
during all that time. Furthermore, the proposition as
worded makes the gist of the adverse possession payment
of taxes, while disregarding the other elements which serve
to bar the claim.
It

Therefore, the third proposition also can more properly
be discussed under the question of "Whether the !claim of
the plaintiffs is barred by the Statute of Limitations."
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I.

The ~ree of distribution did not cover o.r distribute
the automobile in question or any reversionary interest
therein.

The decree ·Of distribution did not distribute the automobile; first, because by its terms the automobile was excluded and not covered; and second, because the deceased
during his lifetime already had made a valid gift of the automobile to the defendant.
In plaintiffs' "Statement of the Case," it is said, "We
are mindful that this court may not review conflicting evidence and determine whether or not the automobile belonged to the estate at the time of the death of Mark Cook.
However, -if the evidence is conclusive that the automobile
belonged to the estate or if it should adopt the view expressed in ·the dissenting opinion of Jackson v. James, 97
Utah 41, 89 P. 2d 235, then and in such case, the plaintiffs ·
are entitled to a judgment for $800.00, the stipulated value
of the automobile." We believe that in each of the premises upon which plaintiffs rely they are in error, but certain
other inquiries should first be considered.
We·may note in passing that the burden was upon the
plaintiffs to shov.r ownership and conversion, and they must
prevail, if at all, on the strength of their own title, 53 Am.'
Jur. Sec. 176, p. 941; Jensen v. James, 50 Utah 485, 167
Pac. 827; Jones v. Commercial Inv. Trust, 64 Utah 137, 228
Pac. 896. On tl;le other hand, proof of actual possession of
property or th~ performance of acts of dominion over it
raises a presumption of ownership. 54 C. J. Sec. 243, p.
541.
_ Now, did the decree of distribution either actually or
purportedly distribute the automobile to plaintiffs?
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The plaintiffs claim through the decree of distribution
in the Mark Cook estate on the basis of the contention that
even though the automobile was not specifically listed in
the report, nor in the inventory and appraisement, nor in
the proceedings for inheritance tax, it nevertheless was
distributed by the general provisions of the decree of distribution, as follows:
"It is therefore hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the final account of said executor Mark B.
Cook be and the same is hereby approved, allowed and
settled, and that the residue of said estate of Mark
Cook, deceased, as hereinafter particularly described,
and any and all other property not now known or discovered, which may belong to the said estate or- which
said estate may have any interest in, and the same is
hereby distributed in accordance with the last will and
testament of the said decedent, ~nd as he,reinafter set
out, to-wit:"
(Emphasis added)
(Then is described specific property, not including the automobile.)
It seems clear from an examination of the above quoted
provision from the decree that the court directly distributed
the residue of the estate, "as hereinafter particularly descr1"bed . · . . ." The automobile in question ·was not
listed therein.
The plaintiffs in their testimony show very clearly that
prior to the date of this decree they had full knowledge of
the claims of Mark B. Cook, and the court so found.
:Ueah C. Jones, as early as February of 1945, knew of
the claim of the defendant to the ownership of the car and
she investigated at the State Tax Commission office in Salt
Lake. She also knew that the defendant was using the car
in ways inconsistent with his fiduciary duty to the estate
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had the car belonged to it, and that he paid taxes on it
from his own resources.
Martha .C. Whiting knew of the defendant's use and of
his keeping of the car, and his assertion of ownership was
brought clearly to her attention on the 24th of July, 1944,
\vhen the defendant refused a request to permit her son
to drive the car to Logan. The car was known, discovered
and discussed on all sides, and in fact plaintiffs intentionally
refrained from ··raising any issue and from questioning the
defendant's right. Under these facts, it cannot be said this
property was "not known or discovered" at the time of the
hearing of the final account.
The final account and decree of distribution in its material parts was read into the record (Tr 33-34) . While the
recital of the decree referred to "other property not now
known or discovered," the decree itself is specific as to the ·
property decreed and provides that "said property above
referred to and hereby distributed is described as follows:"
(Then follows the description of specific property, not including the automobile in question; the- description neither
directly or indirectly includes other property, whether discovered or undiscovered) (Tr 34) .
It also seems significant that in the will of Mark Cook
and Irene B. Cook, while the plaintiffs were named as residuary legatees, a large number of the items cvered by such
residuary clause \Vere specified in the will itself, even to the
extent of reference to "cash in any bank or banks,'' capital
stock or various named companies, and "household furniture and furnishings." It seems natural that if the automobile were owned or claimed by the decedents, or either
of them, at the time the will was made, it would have been
mentioned, as it was the only item of property claimed by
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the residuary legatees which was not specified (Tr 29).
In addition to the fact that the decree of distribution
does not purport to cover the automobile, there is another
reason why it was not distributed as a part of the estate
of Mark Cook, deceased, to-wit: Because it did not belong
to Mark Cook, the father, at the time of his death, he having given it to the defendant in May, 1943. The automobile was given by Mark Cook to the defendant the first part
of May, and the will was made out on the ·26th day of May,
1943 (Tr 29) .
There can be no question as to the delivery, for ·not
only was the car itself in the possession or defendant, but
the certificate of title and the extra set of keys were handed
to the defendant. A symbolical delivery alone is. sufficient, but here we had both. See 38 CJS, Sec. 18, p. 794; also
Sec. 21, p. 801.
Where the property is already in the possession of the
donee, no change in possession is necessary to effectuate
a gift. 38 CJS, Sec. 24, p. 803.
It is argued by the plaintiffs that the gift to the defendant of the automobile in May, 1943, was conditional,
and the condition having been broken, the gift failed. By
the undisputed evidence, there was a gift, and plaintiffs are
forced to·,concede this, but they seem to rely upon the -claim
of condition broken. There is no evidence of any broken
or violated understanding, and on the other hand, the undisputed evidence is that even after the father's death, the
defendant took ·his mother to Arizona in the car. Because
he would not entrust the car to· the son of one of the plaintiffs, shows no broken condition, and could in no way affect the gift; on the contrary, it brought home defendant's
adverse position as against the plaintiffs.
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A gift must be absolute and unconditional. Thus, a
gift inter vivos is not effective if delivery to the donee is
made conditional on the donor's qeath, or non-return, or in
case anything happens to him. But the mere fact that the
gift is accompanied by a condition or qualification not inconsistent with the vesting of title in the donee does not render it invalid. Thus a gift on the condition that the donee
shallgive a part of the property to a designated third person is a valid gift. 28 CJ, "Gifts," Sec. 41 (H), p. 646.
The appellants argue (p. 27 of their brief) that there
is nothing in the evidence that Mark B. Cook accepted the
gift.
The acceptance of a gift, beneficial to the donee and
otherwise complete, will be presumed unless the contrary
is made to appear. 28 CJ, "Gifts," pp. 672; 38 CJS, p. 808.
Not only is there such a presumption, but the evidence affirmatively shows, and the court found, that ever since
the ·Change of possession in May, 1943, the defendant held
possession under claim of right. The plaintiffs' argument
that defendant repudiated the condition of the gift by refusal to take his mother to Logan is without merit in point
of Iaw, as has been seen above, and also in point of fact for
the request came from one, of the plaintiffs for her son to
drive the car, and as far as the ·record shows, this was the
only request. His refusal to tum the car over to the son
was a clear assertion of his right to the car, and again put
the plaintiffs on notice thereof.
The delivery of a gift is a matter of intent, and intent
is to be arrived at from all the fates and circumstances of
the case. Reed, et al, v. Knudson, et al, 80 Utah 428, 15
P. 2d 347.
There is nothing in the record which indicates in any
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way that the gift was not made as testified by the defendant's wife and all other facts and circumstances, including
possession, omission from the estate with knowledge of
plaintiffs, and exercise of dominion by defendant. Even the
evidence relied upon by plaintiffs support the gift, for on
the insurance, while the mother paid for the liability insurance "so Mark would not get into trouble," the defendant reimbursed her, and he himself took out full coverage,
including collision insurance.
As to argument that without an endorsement by Mark
Cook, the father, of the certificate of ownership, there
could be no valid gift, the ease of Jackson v. James, 97 Utah
41, 89 P. 2d 235, .seems to dispose of such contention. This
case also cites numerous cases reflecting the Utah law of'
gifts. The plaintiffs, in their brief, seem to hold that this
court should now adopt the dissenting opinion in the Jack•.
SC?n case. We submit that the majority opinion reflects theproper rule of law, it is fully in accord with reason and other authority, and there is no reason why it should not be
followed in this case.
The failure to comply with the law of signing the legal
title and having the transfer required, does not make a
transfer of an automobile unlaWful so as to prevent the
equitable title to the automobile passing to the purchaser
or donee. Mandes v. Mendes~ ·(Calif) 217 Pac. 1078; Briedwell et al, v. Henderson, (Ore) 195 Pac. 575; Weideman v.
Campbell, et al, 215 Pac. 885; Whitworth v. Jones, (Calif)
209 Pac. 60; Pendell v. Thomas·, 272 Pac. 306; Sidney v.
Wilson, 67 Cat A;pp. 282; Moody_ v. Goodwin, 53 Cal App.
693, 200 Pac. 733; Boles v. ··stiles, (Calif) ~04 Pae. · 848;
Votaw v. Farmers Auto Ins. Co., 85 P. 2d 872; Votaw v.
Farmers Auto Ins. Co.,- 97 P. 2d 958, especially 962.
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Property need not be included in the inventory which
the decedent transferred either by gift or sale during his
lifetime, and the title thereto does not vest in the executor
or the heir. 33 CJS, pp. 1076, 1087.
ll.

The probate prQceedings are res judicata of plaintiffs'
claim to the automobile.

We perhaps should notice at the outset in this division
the last (unnumbered) heading of plaintiffs' brief, pp. 2829, under which it is contended that the trial court erred
in ·admitting in evidence the certification to the inventory
and appraisement filed in the estate of Mark Cook. The
resourceful but dubious argument is advanced that the exhibit mentioned was testimony of transactions with the deceased in contravention of .Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 10449-2. The plaintiffs, themselves, put in evidence the decree
of distribution in the estate matter (Tr 30-34). Bearing
on the question of notice of plaintiffs' claims and on what
plaintiffs were charged with knowing, and as to the proceedings before the probate court, the inventory and appraisement, together with the eertification thereof, was received. The plaintiffs made no objection to the inventory
and appraisement, but objected to the verification thereof
by the executor. Such objection had no merit, because it,
in no way, or indirectly, \Vas as to communications with
the deceased. 1."he same coinment as was made by the court
in Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 89 P 2d 237, seems appropriate here: "In this connection, appellant argues that
the court erred in permitting plaintiff to testify, contending. that she was barred by the provisions of Sec. 104-49-2,
RS of Utah, 1933. Plaintiff did not testify as to any transactions had with the deceased, or as to any conversations
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with him, and there was consequently no error in permitting her to testify as a witness."
The objections raised bear no relationship to the evidence objected to, and moreover any possible substance to
the objection could not raise or involve any prejudice, since
it was admitted by plaintiff that the automobile was not
included in the inventory and in any event, since in the absence of a finding on the issue of ownership or gift, it could
not possibly have been considered by the court as plaintiffs
infer. In short, the inventory and appraisement being ad•
missible, there was no reason why it should be admitted
piecemeal. See 23 CJ, Sec. 383, pp. 1167, 1168.
Now, passing to the principal question as to the bind . .
ing effect of the proceedings in the probate court.
In re: Rice's Estate, 111 Utah, 428, 182 P. 2d 111, it
is held that a decree of distribution in probate proceedings
after due and legal . notice by a court having jurisdiction
of the subject-matter, is conclusive as to the fund property,
items and matters covered by and properly included within
the decree until set aside or modified by the ·court entering
the decree in the manner described by law r until reversed
on appeal.
Cases are then cited and a referep.ce is made to Sec.
102-11-37, UCA, 1943:
"The settlement of the account, and the allowance
thereof by the court, or upon appeal, is conclusive
against all persons in any way interested in the estate,
saving, however, to all persons laboring under any legal disability their right to move for cause to reopen
and examine the account, or to proceed by action
against the executor or administrator either individually or upon his bond, at any time before final distribution . .
"
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T~e

court then says: "This section and the two quoted
cases do not hold that a person defrauded by the acts of an
executor or administrator is without means to correct the
injustice. Sestion 102-14-23, UCA, 1943, sets out a remedy to the person so injured.
-" 'Mistakes in settlement may be corrected before final
settlement and discharge, and after such time by an action
in equity, on such showing as will justify the interference
of the court.'
· ''Being limited to his relief in equity, has the petitioner
stated facts sufficient to eonstitute a cause of action against·,
the executrix or trustee? To do this he must allege facts
to show fraudulent acts or conduct on the part of the executrix sufficient to establish 'extrinsic fraud.'"
On the second appeal, Rice v. Rice,
Utah _ _
212 P. 2d 685, which related to the sufficiency of the evidence and not wholly to the pleadings,. the court held that
the evidence showed extrinsic fraud sufficient to authorize
the intervention of a court of equity, while recognizing that
, judgments must be sustained and "not for anything but
the most compelling reasons" set aside. In the Rice cases,
the claims of the executrix originated under the will at the
expense of the other legatee. In the instant case the defendant came into the possession and ownership of the car
before the death of the testator. It was never a part of
his estate, and the plaintiffs knew of defendant's claims
prior. to the time the defendant even knew there \vas a will.
The· defendant here made his claim in good faith with the
l<nowledge of plaintiffs as the ,court found. The plaintiffs
intentionally raised no issue. during the probate proceed-
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ings; they attended the hearing at which the property in
the estate, not including the automobile, was ordered· distributed. They said or did nothing until long after the decree of distribution had become final and, as a matter of
fact, until just a short time before the commencement of
the present action. In this action, they did not attack in
their pleadings, or at the trial, the probate decree by an action in equity but have brought a purely legal action for
conversion, and the case was tried on the theory of conversion. There was no fraud, overreaching or imposition. See
also In re: Raleigh's Estate, 48 'Utah_ 138, 158 Pac. 705.
If, under such circumstances, a probate ·decree could
any
be impeached, there would be little hope of finality
decree. Judgments of courts, whether in law or equity,
should not be lightly disregarded or set aside, particularly
when attacked collaterally.

to

On page 18 of their brief, plaintiffs cite Sontag v. Superior Court, 36 P. 2d 140; Walls v. Walker, 37 Cal. 424,
99 Am. Dec. 290, and other cases in suport of the proposition that settlement of an executor"s account in the absence
of an appeal is conclusive only as to such matte~s as were
actually included in the account. Most of these cases involve direct proceedings in the probate court itself, and il- ·
lustrate the usual remedies of proceeding for correction or _
supplementing of successive accounts in the same proceed~
ing. Thus, in Sontag ·v. Superior Court, an account was approved expressly without prejudice to the subsequent claim
in question. None of these· cases are in point as to the case
here. They have no application to a situation involving theapproval of a final account and report, and a decree of final
distribution and the acceptance of that decree by the heirs,
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without appeal or petition to modify or correct, and a subsequent collateral attack in a purely law action.
At no place in the pleadings is it alleged by plaintiffs
that there was any fraud, either intrinsic or extrinsic. There
seems no pleading to invoke any inquiry as to whether the
decree of the probate court should be set aside in the exercise of any equity powers, the issues raised by the pleadings
being: first, whether plaintiffs were the owners of the automobile; second, was there a conversion? Third, whether
the plaintiffs' claims to the property were res judicata by
virtue of the probate proceedings; and fourth, whether the
claims of the plaintiffs were barred by the Statute of Limitations.
_ The plaintiffs claim that they were the owners of property when the claimed conversion occurred, and the defendant denied such ownership and proved that he was the
owner, both by reason of a gift from his father and by reason of the defenses of res judicata and the Statute of Limitations._ No pleadings for the purpose of, or authorizing,
the setting aside of the decree of the probate court were
filed and no evidence is disclosed which would justify the
setting aside of the probate decree even though there were
proper pleadings before the court.
III.

The plaintiffs' claim to the automobile is barred by
the Statute of Limitations.

As a further defense and bar to the action alleged by
the plaintiffs against the defendant, the defendant sets up
Section 104-2-24 (2), UCA, 1943, which is in these words,
so far as pertains to the matter involved here: "Within
three years * * ~: * (2) an action for taking, de-
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taining or injuring personal property, including actions for
specific recovery thereof.''
The Statute of Ui.mitations operates as a bar in equity
as well as law. It does not operate as a rule of evidence
by producing a presumption of payment only~ but as a positive bar. See 37 CJ, Sec. 18, p. 699.
The same text states:
"The general rule with respect to debts or money
demands is that the statute of limitations are regarded
as barring that remedy, and not as extinguishing the
cause of action."
Citing authorities, including re: Reiser's Estate, 57 Utah
434, 195 Pac. 317:
"But with respect to actions for the recoyery of
real or personal property, the weight of authority is in
favor of the proposition that, where one has had the
peaceable, undisturbed, open pessession of personal, as
well as real property, with an assertion of his ownership for the period which, under the law, would bar an
action for its recovery by the real owners, the former
has acquired a good title-a title superior to that of
the latter, whose neglect to avail himself of his legal
rights has lost him his rights." In Nichols v. Randall, (Calif) 69 Pac. 26, the court said:
"Statutes of Limitations have become rules of property. They are vital to the welfare of society and are
favored by law. They are found and approved in all
systems of enlightened jurispnldence. They promot~
repose by giving stability and security to human atfairs. Important public policy lies at their foundation.
They stimulate to activity and prevent negligence.
While time is constantly destroying the evidence of
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rights, they supply its place by presumption which ren-ders proof unnecessary.''
In Snow v. West, 35 Utah 206, 99 Pac. 674, 136 Am. St.

Rep. 1047, it is indicated that an action for claim and delivery against the sheriff and judgment creditor to recover
damages sustained by reason of alleged wrongful seizure
and sale of property claimed to be exempt from execution
\Vas \vithin Section 102-2-24, and the three-year Statute of
Limitations applied.
In the case of Dee v. Hyland, et al, 3 Utah 208, 3 Pac.
388, which was brought for the recovery of the possession
of a horse, or in case possession could not be had, the value
thereof, the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations.
The court held that inasmuch as the horse had been in the
possession of the defendant and his predecessors in interest
for more than three years, the Statute applied although
plaintiff claimed and proved that he had no knowledge of
the whereabouts of the horse until shortly before the action
was commenced.
Aside from the above mentioned principles of law,
claims under the preceding division applies here.
Both Leah C. Jones and Martha C. Whiting testified
to the refusal of the defendant to permit the son of Mrs.
Whiting to drive their mother and others to Logan on or
about the 24th of July, 1944 and in the following February,
the two witnesses were sufficiently concerned about the
defendant's claims that the plaintiff, Leah C. Jones, made a
personal investigation as to the condition of the title to the
car. She further testified that she knew that the taxes
were being paid by the defendant. Certainly, all were
charged with the knowledge that in the accounts rendered
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in the estate of Mark- Cook, deceased, there were no claims
for taxes upon the automobile.
The court found that the plaintiffs knew of the defendant's assertion of title sometime in February of 1945. We
think they knew of such claim long prior to this time. Taking, however, the date found by the court, we have this situation:
The complaint in the instant action \Vas filed on May
22nd, 1948. The three-year Statute of Limitations, beginning to run before February of 1948 or before. Thus, the
instant action was brought approximately three months
after the expiration of the statutory period. rhe action is
therefore further barred by reason of the Statute of Limi..
tations.
Plaintiffs' argument that defendant was a trustee and
therefore the Statute did not run in his favor ignores the
facts that the rights and claims of defendant.originated prior to the death of his father and that, as the court found
and the undisputed evidence disclosed, the plaintiffs had
knowledge of his adverse claims long prior to his appoint..
ment as executor, and in fact, before he knew there was a
will. There never was a trust in this case as far as the
automobile was concerned, and the authorities ·cited by
plaintiffs are not in point.
CONCLUSION

The arguments advanced by plaintiffs in support of
their claim that the judgment -should be reversed are more
dexterious than sound. There was a gift, but failure to so
find could not be prejudicial to the plaintiffs. The failure
of Mark Cook to endorse the title certificate is immaterial,
but can be understood in view of the parties having· the
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same name. This case does not involve a suit .in equity for
the impeachment of a decree for extrinsic fraud. There is
no such proceeding involved, and if there were, the evidence
fails to show and fraud or overreaching, exerinsic or intrinsi·c. The plaintiffs have had their day in court. They had
knowledge of the rights of defendant since February, 1945,
or before. Their present elaim is barred both by the Statute of Limitations and under the doctrine of res adjudicata.
It is the position of defendant that the trial court was
correct in holding that the decree settling the final report
and account and decree of distribution in the probate case
was res judicata; and that the trial court. was further correct in holding that the plaintiffs' cause of action was barred
by the Statute of Limitations. If both of these holdings
were erroneous, and only then, would the question of whether there was, in fact, a gift of the automobile to the defendant in May, 1943, be material. Where a plea of res adjudicata is properly sustained, the failure of the ·court to make
specific findings on the _contentions of the plaintiff is not
error. Torsak v. Rukavina, 67 Utah 166, 246 Pac. 367.
If it should be determined that the court \Vere in error
in determining the case on the issues of res judicata and the
Statute of Limitations and that it should have made findings as to the o'vnership of the property as of the time of
the com1nencement of plaintiffs' action, it is the position of
respondent that nevertheless, the judgment should be sustained under the cross- assignment of error, as the. evidence
shows without ·conflict thaf the automobile was given to.
th:e defendant in May, 1943, and that he was the owner of
said automobile at the time of the commencement of this
action and at all times since the first part of May, 1943.
Failure to find on an issue where th~ evidence is without
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conflict, as we have endeavored to show is the case as to
the issue of gift, would not justify a reversal of the judgment.
However, we submit that the court did not err in deciding the case on the Statute of Limitations and the plea
of res judicata. _On either and both of these phases, the
findings, conclusions and judgment finally dispose of this
case. The claimed assignments of error of the plaintiffs
are not well taken, and none of them are well taken.
The judgment of the lower court in dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint should be affirmed, with costs to defendant
and respondent.
Respectfully submitted,.
A. H. CHRISTENSON
A. SHERMAN CHRISTE,NSON
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
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